Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a non cooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the game in its normal form representation.
This book rejects that suggestion, arguing that a game's normal form representation often omits essential information from the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory. The book offers a synthesis of current knowledge about extensive form games from an evolutionary perspective, emphasizing connections between the extensive form representation and dynamic models that traditionally have been applied to biological and economic phenomena.
It develops a general theory to analyze dynamically arbitrary extensive form games and applies this theory to a range of examples. It lays the foundation for the analyses of specific extensive form models of behavior and for the further theoretical study of extensive form evolutionary games.