9,49 €
Money and Government. A Challenge to Mainstream Economics
Par :Formats :
Disponible dans votre compte client Decitre ou Furet du Nord dès validation de votre commande. Le format ePub protégé est :
- Compatible avec une lecture sur My Vivlio (smartphone, tablette, ordinateur)
- Compatible avec une lecture sur liseuses Vivlio
- Pour les liseuses autres que Vivlio, vous devez utiliser le logiciel Adobe Digital Edition. Non compatible avec la lecture sur les liseuses Kindle, Remarkable et Sony
- Non compatible avec un achat hors France métropolitaine
, qui est-ce ?Notre partenaire de plateforme de lecture numérique où vous retrouverez l'ensemble de vos ebooks gratuitement
Pour en savoir plus sur nos ebooks, consultez notre aide en ligne ici
C'est si simple ! Lisez votre ebook avec l'app Vivlio sur votre tablette, mobile ou ordinateur :
- Nombre de pages352
- FormatePub
- ISBN978-0-241-35283-0
- EAN9780241352830
- Date de parution06/09/2018
- Protection num.Adobe DRM
- Infos supplémentairesepub
- ÉditeurPENGUIN
Résumé
The dominant view in economics is that money and government should play only a minor role in economic life. Money, it is claimed, is nothing more than a medium of exchange; and economic outcomes are best left to the 'invisible hand' of the market. In contrast, the view taken in this important new book is that the omnipresence of uncertainty makes money and government essential features of any market economy.
One reason we want to hold onto money is that we don't know what the future will bring. Government - good government - makes the future more predictable and therefore reduces this demand for money. After Adam Smith, orthodoxy persistently espoused non-intervention in markets, but the Great Depression of 1929-32 stopped the artificers of orthodox economics in their tracks. A precarious balance of forces between government, employers, and trade unions enabled Keynesian economics to emerge as the new policy paradigm of the Western world.
However, the stagflation of the 1970s led to the rejection of Keynesian policy and a return to small-state neoclassical dominance. Thirty years later, the 2008 global financial crash was severe enough to have shaken the neoclassical supremacy, but, curiously, this did not happen. Once the crisis had been overcome - by Keynesian measures taken in desperation - the pre-crash dogma was reinstated, undermined but unbowed.
Since then, no new 'big idea' has emerged, and neoclassical economics has maintained its sway, enacting punishing austerity agendas that leave us with a still-anaemic global economy. This book aims to familiarize the reader with essential elements of Keynes's 'big idea'. By showing that much of economic orthodoxy is far from being the hard science it claims to be, it aims to embolden the next generation of economists to break free from their conceptual prisons and afford money and government the starring roles in the economic drama that they deserve.
One reason we want to hold onto money is that we don't know what the future will bring. Government - good government - makes the future more predictable and therefore reduces this demand for money. After Adam Smith, orthodoxy persistently espoused non-intervention in markets, but the Great Depression of 1929-32 stopped the artificers of orthodox economics in their tracks. A precarious balance of forces between government, employers, and trade unions enabled Keynesian economics to emerge as the new policy paradigm of the Western world.
However, the stagflation of the 1970s led to the rejection of Keynesian policy and a return to small-state neoclassical dominance. Thirty years later, the 2008 global financial crash was severe enough to have shaken the neoclassical supremacy, but, curiously, this did not happen. Once the crisis had been overcome - by Keynesian measures taken in desperation - the pre-crash dogma was reinstated, undermined but unbowed.
Since then, no new 'big idea' has emerged, and neoclassical economics has maintained its sway, enacting punishing austerity agendas that leave us with a still-anaemic global economy. This book aims to familiarize the reader with essential elements of Keynes's 'big idea'. By showing that much of economic orthodoxy is far from being the hard science it claims to be, it aims to embolden the next generation of economists to break free from their conceptual prisons and afford money and government the starring roles in the economic drama that they deserve.
The dominant view in economics is that money and government should play only a minor role in economic life. Money, it is claimed, is nothing more than a medium of exchange; and economic outcomes are best left to the 'invisible hand' of the market. In contrast, the view taken in this important new book is that the omnipresence of uncertainty makes money and government essential features of any market economy.
One reason we want to hold onto money is that we don't know what the future will bring. Government - good government - makes the future more predictable and therefore reduces this demand for money. After Adam Smith, orthodoxy persistently espoused non-intervention in markets, but the Great Depression of 1929-32 stopped the artificers of orthodox economics in their tracks. A precarious balance of forces between government, employers, and trade unions enabled Keynesian economics to emerge as the new policy paradigm of the Western world.
However, the stagflation of the 1970s led to the rejection of Keynesian policy and a return to small-state neoclassical dominance. Thirty years later, the 2008 global financial crash was severe enough to have shaken the neoclassical supremacy, but, curiously, this did not happen. Once the crisis had been overcome - by Keynesian measures taken in desperation - the pre-crash dogma was reinstated, undermined but unbowed.
Since then, no new 'big idea' has emerged, and neoclassical economics has maintained its sway, enacting punishing austerity agendas that leave us with a still-anaemic global economy. This book aims to familiarize the reader with essential elements of Keynes's 'big idea'. By showing that much of economic orthodoxy is far from being the hard science it claims to be, it aims to embolden the next generation of economists to break free from their conceptual prisons and afford money and government the starring roles in the economic drama that they deserve.
One reason we want to hold onto money is that we don't know what the future will bring. Government - good government - makes the future more predictable and therefore reduces this demand for money. After Adam Smith, orthodoxy persistently espoused non-intervention in markets, but the Great Depression of 1929-32 stopped the artificers of orthodox economics in their tracks. A precarious balance of forces between government, employers, and trade unions enabled Keynesian economics to emerge as the new policy paradigm of the Western world.
However, the stagflation of the 1970s led to the rejection of Keynesian policy and a return to small-state neoclassical dominance. Thirty years later, the 2008 global financial crash was severe enough to have shaken the neoclassical supremacy, but, curiously, this did not happen. Once the crisis had been overcome - by Keynesian measures taken in desperation - the pre-crash dogma was reinstated, undermined but unbowed.
Since then, no new 'big idea' has emerged, and neoclassical economics has maintained its sway, enacting punishing austerity agendas that leave us with a still-anaemic global economy. This book aims to familiarize the reader with essential elements of Keynes's 'big idea'. By showing that much of economic orthodoxy is far from being the hard science it claims to be, it aims to embolden the next generation of economists to break free from their conceptual prisons and afford money and government the starring roles in the economic drama that they deserve.
