Scientific Realism. How Science Tracks Truth

Par : Stathis Psillos

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  • Nombre de pages341
  • PrésentationBroché
  • Poids0.625 kg
  • Dimensions15,7 cm × 23,4 cm × 1,9 cm
  • ISBN0-415-20819-X
  • EAN9780415208192
  • Date de parution21/10/1999
  • ÉditeurRoutledge

Résumé

Scientific realism is the optimistic view that modern science is on the right track; that the world really is the way our best scientific theories describe it. In his book, Stathis Psillos gives us a detailed and comprehensive study which restores the intuitive plausibility of scientific realism. We see that throughout the twentieth century, scientific realism has been challenged by philosophical positions from all angles: from reductive empiricism, through instrumentalism to modern sceptical empiricism. Scientific Realism explains that the history of science does net undermine the arguments for scientific realism, but instead makes it reasonable to accept scientific realism as the best philosophical account of science, its empirical success, its progress and its practice. Anyone wishing to gain a deeper understanding of philosophical debates about the state of modern science, and why scientific realism is plausible, should read this book.
Scientific realism is the optimistic view that modern science is on the right track; that the world really is the way our best scientific theories describe it. In his book, Stathis Psillos gives us a detailed and comprehensive study which restores the intuitive plausibility of scientific realism. We see that throughout the twentieth century, scientific realism has been challenged by philosophical positions from all angles: from reductive empiricism, through instrumentalism to modern sceptical empiricism. Scientific Realism explains that the history of science does net undermine the arguments for scientific realism, but instead makes it reasonable to accept scientific realism as the best philosophical account of science, its empirical success, its progress and its practice. Anyone wishing to gain a deeper understanding of philosophical debates about the state of modern science, and why scientific realism is plausible, should read this book.